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INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

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ADDITIONAL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS BEARING UPON THE EUROPEAN WAR

- I SPEECH OF THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR TO REICHSTAG,
AUGUST 4, 1914
- II SPEECH OF THE PRIME MINISTER TO HOUSE OF COMMONS
AUGUST 6, 1914
- III THE RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK
- IV THE ORIGINAL TEXTS OF THE AUSTRIAN NOTE OF JULY
23, 1914, AND THE SERBIAN REPLY OF JULY 25, 1914,
WITH ANNOTATIONS



NOVEMBER, 1914, No. 84

American Association for International Conciliation
Sub-station 84 (407 West 117th Street)
New York City

The Executive Committee of the Association for International Conciliation wish to arouse the interest of the American people in the progress of the movement for promoting international peace and relations of comity and good fellowship between nations. To this end they print and circulate documents giving information as to the progress or interruption of these movements, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have readily available accurate information on these subjects. A list of publications will be found on pages 58 and 59.

PRESIDENT WILSON'S APPEAL FOR IMPARTIALITY AND RESTRAINT IN DIS- CUSSING THE WAR

MY FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN: I suppose that every thoughtful man in America has asked himself during the last troubled weeks what influence the European war may exert upon the United States, and I take the liberty of addressing a few words to you in order to point out that it is entirely within our own choice what its effects upon us will be and to urge very earnestly upon you the sort of speech and conduct which will best safeguard the nation against distress and disaster.

The effect of the war upon the United States will depend upon what American citizens say or do. Every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned. The spirit of the nation in this critical matter will be determined largely by what individuals and society and those gathered in public meetings do and say, upon what newspapers and magazines contain, upon what our ministers utter in their pulpits and men proclaim as their opinions on the streets.

The people of the United States are drawn from many nations, and chiefly from the nations now at war. It is natural and inevitable that there should be the utmost variety of sympathy and desire among them with regard to the issues and circumstances of the conflict. Some will wish one nation, others another, to succeed in the momentous struggle. It will be easy to excite passion and difficult to allay it. Those responsible for exciting it will assume a heavy responsibility; responsibility for no less a thing than that the people of the United States, whose love of their country and whose loyalty to its Government should unite them as Americans all, bound in honor and affection to think first of her and her interests, may be divided in camps of hostile opinions, hot against each other, involved in the war itself in impulse and opinion, if not in action. Such diversions among us would be fatal to our peace of mind and might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend.

I venture, therefore, my fellow-countrymen, to speak a solemn word of warning to you against that deepest, most subtle, most essential breach of neutrality which may spring out of partisanship, out of passionately taking sides. The United States must be neutral in fact as well as in name during these days that are to try men's souls. We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another.

My thought is of America. I am speaking, I feel sure, the earnest wish and purpose of every thoughtful American that this great country of ours, which is, of course, the first in our thoughts and in our hearts, should show herself in this time of peculiar trial a nation fit beyond others to exhibit the fine poise of undisturbed judgment, the dignity of self-control, the efficiency of dispassionate action, a nation that neither sits in judgment upon others nor is disturbed in her own counsels and which keeps herself fit and free to do what is honest and disinterested and truly serviceable for the peace of the world.

Shall we not resolve to put upon ourselves the restraint which will bring to our people the happiness and the great and lasting influence for peace we covet for them?

WOODROW WILSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 18, 1914.

I

SPEECH OF THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR BEFORE THE GERMAN DIET, AUGUST 4, 1914

For 44 years since the time we fought for and won the German Empire and our position in the world, we have lived in peace and have protected the peace of Europe. In peaceable labor we have become strong and powerful, thereby arousing the envy of others. Patiently did we bear it when enmity was raised against us in the East and the West and fetters were forged for us, because Germany was said to wish for war. The wind then sown now has brought forth a harvest of Whitewind. We wished to continue our peaceful labors and like a secret vow the feeling ran from the Emperor down to the youngest soldier: Our sword shall only fly from its scabbard in defense of a just cause!

The day has now come when we must draw it, against our wish, and in spite of our sincere endeavors.

Russia has set fire to the building.

We are at war with Russia and France, a war forced upon us.

Gentlemen, a number of documents, composed during the pressure of these last days filled with hurried events, is before you. Allow me to accentuate those facts which characterize our actions.

From the first moment of the Austro-Servian conflict it was our opinion and aim that this conflict be limited to Austria-Hungary and Servia. All cabinets, especially England, took the same point of view, only Russia asserted that it had to take a hand in the settling of this matter.

The danger of a European crisis arose.

As soon as the first definite information about military preparations in Russia reached us, we informed St. Petersburg in a friendly but pressing manner that military measures against Austria would find us on the side of our ally and that military preparations against ourselves would oblige us to take countermeasures. But mobilization would be close to actual war.

Russia formally assured us of her desire for peace and declared that she was making no military preparations against us.

In the meantime, England, warmly assisted by us, tried to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

On the 28th of July, the Emperor, by telegram, asked the Czar to consider that Austria-Hungary had the duty and the right to defend herself against the pan-Serb agitation which undermined her existence. The Emperor called the Czar's attention to the fact that the interests of all monarchs must be identical in face of the murder of Serajevo. He asked him to personally assist him and to smooth over the divergence between Vienna and St. Petersburg. About the same time and before receipt of this telegram, the Czar asked the Emperor to help him and to induce Vienna to moderate her demands.

The Emperor accepted the rôle of a mediator.

But scarcely had the action begun, according to his orders, when

Russia mobilized all her forces directed against Austria, while Austria-Hungary only had mobilized those of her corps which were directed against Servia. To the north she only had mobilized two of her corps, far from the Russian frontier.

The Emperor immediately informed the Czar that this mobilization of the Russian forces against Austria rendered the rôle of a mediator, which he had accepted upon the Czar's request, difficult, if not impossible.

Still we continued to mediate in Vienna, a mediation which in its form went as far as would appear permissible, even for an ally.

During this time Russia of her own accord renewed her assurances that she was making no military preparations against us.

The 31st of July has come. The decision is to fall in Vienna. We have already learned, thanks to our representations, that Vienna again has started the direct conversation with St. Petersburg which had already suffered an interruption. But before the final decision is taken in Vienna, the news arrives that Russia has mobilized her *entire* army and navy, *therefore also against us!* The Russian Government, who knew from our repeated statements what mobilization on our frontiers meant, did not notify us of this mobilization nor did it even vouchsafe any explanation. Only in the afternoon of July 31st, a telegram of the Czar to the Emperor arrived in which he guaranteed that his army would take no provocative attitude towards us. But the mobilization on our frontiers was in full swing since the night from the 30th to the 31st of July.

While we are mediating in Vienna in compliance with Russia's request, the Russian host arises all along our extended and open frontier, and France, though not mobilizing, must admit that she makes military preparations.

We had ourselves, up to then, not called in a single man for the sake of the peace of Europe. Were we now to patiently wait until the nations between which our country is situated, selected the moment for their attack? It would have been a crime to expose Germany to such peril. Therefore, on the 31st of July, we demanded demobilization from Russia as the only means to still preserve the peace of Europe. The Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg was besides instructed to inform the Russian Government that in case our demand meeting with a refusal, we would have to consider the state of war as existent.

The Imperial Ambassador followed these instructions. *What Russia answered to our demand of demobilization, we have not learnt up to this day.* Telegraphic reports on this question have not reached us even though the wire still transmitted much less important information.

Therefore, the time limit having long since expired, the Emperor saw himself obliged to mobilize our forces on the first of August, at 5 p. m.

At the same time we needed a positive assurance about the position France would take. Our direct question if she would remain neutral in a Russo-German war, was answered by her reply that she would do what her interests demanded. That was a subterfuge, if not a refusal.

In spite of this, the Emperor gave the order to absolutely respect the French frontier. This order was strictly obeyed, with one single exception. France, who mobilized at the same time as we did, assured us that she would respect a zone of 10 kilometers on her frontier. What was the outcome? Aviators throwing bombs, cavalry patrols and infantry detachments in the territory of the Empire!

Though war had not been declared, France thereby had broken the peace and had de facto attacked us.

Concerning the one exception on our side which I mentioned, the Chief of the General Staff reports as follows:

Only one of the French reclamations about crossing of the frontier from our side is justified. Against express orders, a patrol of the 14th army corps, apparently led by an officer, crossed the frontier on August 2nd. They seem to have been shot and killed, only one man having returned. But long before this isolated instance of crossing occurred, French aviators had thrown bombs on our railway tracks far into Southern Germany, French troops had attacked our frontier guard on the "Schlucht Pass." Our troops have obeyed orders and merely defended themselves. So far the report of the General Staff.

Gentlemen, we are now acting in self-defense. Necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have possibly already entered on Belgian soil.

Gentlemen, that is a breach of international law.

The French Government has notified Brussels that it would respect Belgian neutrality as long as the adversary respected it. But we know that France stood ready for an invasion. France could wait, we could not. A French invasion in our flank and the lower Rhine might have been disastrous. Thus we were forced to ignore the rightful protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. The injustice—I speak openly—the injustice we thereby commit we will try to make good as soon as our military aims have been attained. He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for his All, can only consider the one and best way to strike.

Gentlemen, we stand shoulder to shoulder with Austria-Hungary.—As for England's attitude, the statements made by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons yesterday, show the English point of view. We have informed the English Government that, as long as England remains neutral, our fleet will not attack the northern coast of France and that we will not touch the territorial integrity and independence of Belgium. These assurances I now repeat before the world and I may add that, as long as England remains neutral we would also be willing, upon reciprocity being assured, to take no warlike measures against French commercial shipping.

Gentlemen, thus far the facts. I repeat the words of the Emperor: With a clear conscience we enter the lists. We fight for the fruits of our peaceful labors, for the inheritance of a great past and for our future. The 50 years are not yet gone which Count Moltke said we would have to remain armed to defend the inheritance of the gains of 1870. Now the great hour of trial has struck for our people. Our army is in the field, our navy is ready,—behind them stands the entire German Nation (the members of the Diet rise from their seats). The entire Germany to the last man, you, gentlemen, know your duty to all its intent. The proposed laws need no further explanation. I ask for their being passed.

II

EUROPEAN WAR

Report of a Speech by the Rt. Hon. H. H. Asquith (Prime Minister) in the House of Commons on the 6th August, 1914

In asking the Committee to agree to the Resolution which Mr. Whitley has just read from the Chair,* I do not propose, because I do not think it is in any way necessary, to traverse again the ground which was covered by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary two or three nights ago. He stated—and I do not think any of the statements he made are capable of answer and certainly have not yet been answered—the grounds upon which, with the utmost reluctance and with infinite regret, His Majesty's Government have been compelled to put this country in a state of war with what for many years and indeed generations past has been a friendly Power. But, Sir, the Papers which have since been presented to Parliament, and which are now in the hands of hon. Members, will, I think, show how strenuous, how unremitting, how persistent, even when the last glimmer of hope seemed to have faded away, were the efforts of my right hon. Friend to secure for Europe an honourable and a lasting peace.

Everyone knows in the great crisis which occurred last year in the East of Europe, it was largely, if not mainly, by the acknowledgment of all Europe, due to the steps taken by my right hon. Friend, that the area of the conflict was limited, and that so far as the great Powers are concerned, peace was maintained. If his efforts upon this occasion have, unhappily, been less successful, I am certain that this House and the country—and I will add posterity and history—will accord to him what is, after all, the best tribute that can be paid to any statesman: that, never derogating for an instant or by an inch from the honour and interests of his own country, he has striven, as few men have striven, to maintain and preserve the greatest interest of all countries—universal peace.

These Papers, which are now in the hands of hon. Members, show something more than that. They show what were the terms which were offered to us in exchange for our neutrality. I trust that not only the Members of this House, but all our fellow-subjects everywhere, will read the communications—will read, learn and mark the communications which passed only a week ago to-day between Berlin and London in this matter. The terms by which it was sought to buy our neutrality are contained in the communication made by the German Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen on the 29th July—No. 85 of the published Papers. I think I must refer to them for a moment. After alluding to the state of things as between Austria and Russia, Sir Edward Goschen goes on:—

“He [the German Chancellor] then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was

*“That a sum, not exceeding £100,000,000, be granted to His Majesty, beyond the ordinary grants of Parliament, towards defraying expenses that may be incurred during the year ending March 31st, 1915, for all measures which may be taken for the security of the country, for the conduct of Naval and Military operations, for assisting the food supply, for promoting the continuance of trade, industry, and business communications, whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk, or otherwise for the relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out of the existence of a state of war.”

clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government"—

Let the Committee observe these words—

"aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue."

Sir Edward Goschen proceeded to put a very pertinent question:—

"I question His Excellency about the French colonies"—

What are the French colonies? They mean every part of the dominions and possessions of France outside the geographical area of Europe—

"and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect."

Let me come to what, in my mind, personally has always been the crucial and almost the governing consideration, namely, the position of the small States:—

"As regards Holland, however, His Excellency said that so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise."

Then we come to Belgium:—

"It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but, when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany."

Let the Committee observe the distinction between those two cases. In regard to Holland it was not only independence and integrity, but also neutrality; but in regard to Belgium, there was no mention of neutrality at all, nothing but an assurance that after the war came to an end the integrity of Belgium would be respected. Then His Excellency added:—

"Ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been to bring about an understanding with England. He trusted that these assurances"—

the assurances I have read out to the House—

"might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired."

What does that amount to? Let me just ask the Committee. I do so, not with the object of inflaming passion, certainly not with the object of exciting feeling against Germany, but I do so to vindicate and make clear the position of the British Government in this matter. What did that proposal amount to? In the first place, it meant this: That behind the back of France—they were not made a party to these communications—we should have given, if we had assented to that, a free licence to Germany to annex, in the event of a successful war, the whole of the extra

European dominions and possessions of France. What did it mean as regards Belgium? When she addressed, as she has addressed in these last few days, her moving appeal to us to fulfil our solemn guarantee of her neutrality, what reply should we have given? What reply should we have given to that Belgium appeal? What should we have been obliged to say that, without her knowledge, we had bartered away to the Power threatening her our obligation to keep our plighted word. The House has read, and the country has read, of course, in the last few hours, the most pathetic appeal addressed by the King of Belgium, and I do not envy the man who can read that appeal with an unmoved heart. Belgians are fighting and losing their lives. What would have been the position of Great Britain to-day, in the face of that spectacle, if we had assented to this infamous proposal?

Yes, and what are we to get in return for the betrayal of our friends and the dishonour of our obligations? What are we to get in return? A promise—nothing more; a promise as to what Germany would do in certain eventualities; a promise, be it observed—I am sorry to have to say it, but it must be put upon record—given by a Power which was at that very moment announcing its intention to violate its own treaty and inviting us to do the same. I can only say, if we had dallied or temporized, we, as a Government, should have covered ourselves with dishonour, and we should have betrayed the interests of this country, of which we are trustees. I am glad, and I think the country will be glad, to turn to the reply which my right hon. Friend, and of which I will read to the Committee two of the more salient passages. This document, No. 101 of the Papers, puts on record a week ago the attitude of the British Government, and, as I believe, of the British people. My right hon. Friend says:—

“His Majesty’s Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor’s proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French Colonies are taken if France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the Colonies. From the material point of view”——

My right hon. Friend, as he always does, used very temperate language:—

“Such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.”

That is the material aspect. But he proceeded:—

“Altogether, apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover. The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligations or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.”

He then says:—

“We must preserve our full freedom to act, as circumstances may seem to us to require.”

And he added, I think, in sentences which the Committee must appreciate:—

"You should add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe. . . . For that object this Government will work in that way with all sincerity and goodwill.

"If the peace of Europe can be preserved and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it"—

The statement was never more true—

"as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto."

That document, in my opinion, states clearly, in temperate and convincing language, the attitude of this Government. Can anyone who reads it fail to appreciate the tone of obvious sincerity and earnestness which underlies it; can anyone honestly doubt that the Government of this country in spite of great provocation—and I regard the proposals made to us as proposals which we might have thrown aside without consideration and almost without answer—can anyone doubt that in spite of great provocation the right hon. Gentleman, who had already earned the title—and no one ever more deserved it—of "Peace Maker of Europe," persisted to the very last moment of the last hour in that beneficent but unhappily frustrated purpose?

I am entitled to say, and I do so on behalf of this country—I speak not for a party, I speak for the country as a whole—that we made every effort any Government could possibly make for peace. But this war has been forced upon us. What is it we are fighting for? Everyone knows, and no one knows better than the Government, the terrible, incalculable suffering, economic, social, personal and political, which war, and especially a war with the Great Powers of the world, must entail. There is no man amongst us sitting upon this bench in these trying days—more trying perhaps than any body of statesmen for a hundred years have had to pass through—there is not a man amongst us who has not, during the whole of that time, had clearly before his vision the almost unequalled suffering which war, even in a just cause, must bring about, not only to the people who are for the moment living in this country and in the other countries of the world, but to posterity and to the whole prospects of European civilisation. Every step we took we took with that vision before our eyes, and with a sense of responsibility which it is impossible to describe. Unhappily, in spite of all our efforts to keep the peace, and with that full and overpowering consciousness of the result, if the issue be decided in favour of war, we have, nevertheless, thought it to be the duty as well as the

interest of this country to go to war, the House may be well assured it was because we believe, and I am certain the country will believe that, we are unsheathing our sword in a just cause.

If I am asked what we are fighting for I reply in two sentences. In the first place, to fulfil a solemn international obligation, an obligation which, if it had been entered into between private persons in the ordinary concerns of life, would have been regarded as an obligation not only of law but of honour, which no self-respecting man could possibly have repudiated. I say, secondly, we are fighting to vindicate the principle which, in these days when force, material force, sometimes seems to be the dominant influence and factor in the development of mankind, we are fighting to vindicate the principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good faith, by the arbitrary will of a strong and overmastering Power.

I do not believe any nation ever entered into a great controversy—and this is one of the greatest history will ever know—with a clearer conscience and a stronger conviction that it is fighting, not for aggression, not for the maintenance even of its own selfish interest, but that it is fighting in defence of principles the maintenance of which is vital to the civilisation of the world. With a full conviction, not only of the wisdom and justice, but of the obligations which lay upon us to challenge this great issue, we are entering into the struggle. Let us now make sure that all the resources, not only of this United Kingdom, but of the vast Empire of which it is the centre, shall be thrown into the scale, and it is that that object may be adequately secured, that I am now about to ask this Committee—to make the very unusual demand upon it—to give the Government a Vote of Credit of £100,000,000.

I am not going, and I am sure the Committee do not wish it, into the technical distinctions between Votes of Credit and Supplementary Estimates and all the rarities and refinements which arise in that connection. There is a much higher point of view than that. If it were necessary, I could justify, upon purely technical grounds, the course we propose to adopt, but I am not going to do so, because I think it would be foreign to the temper and disposition of the Committee. There is one thing to which I do call attention, that is, the Title and Heading of the Bill. As a rule, the past Votes of this kind have been taken simply for naval and military operations, but we have thought it right to ask the Committee to give us its confidence in the extension of the traditional area of Votes of Credit, so that this money which we are asking them to allow us to expend may be applied not only for strictly naval and military operations, but to assist the food supplies, promote the continuance of trade, industry, business, and communications, whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk or otherwise, for the relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out of the existence of a state of war.

I believe the Committee will agree with us that it was wise to extend the area of the Vote of Credit so as to include all these various matters. It gives the Government a free hand. Of course, the Treasury will account for it, and any expenditure that takes place will be subject to the approval of the House. I think it would be a great pity—in fact, a great disaster—if, in a crisis of this magnitude, we were not enabled to make provision—provision far more needed now than it was under the simpler conditions

that prevailed in the old days—for all the various ramifications and developments of expenditure which the existence of a state of war between the great Powers of Europe must entail on any one of them.

I am asking also in my character of Secretary of State for War—a position which I held until this morning—for a Supplementary Estimate for men for the Army. Perhaps the Committee will allow me for a moment just to say on that personal matter that I took upon myself the office of Secretary of State for War under conditions, upon which I need not go back, but which are fresh in the minds of everyone, in the hope and with the object that the condition of things in the Army, which all of us deplored, might speedily be brought to an end, and complete confidence re-established. I believe that is the case; in fact, I know it to be. There is no more loyal and united body, no body in which the spirit and habit of discipline are more deeply ingrained and cherished than in the British Army. Glad as I should have been to continue the work of that office, and I would have done so under normal conditions, it would not be fair to the Army, it would not be just to the country, that any Minister should divide his attention between that Department and another, still less that the First Minister of the Crown, who has to look into the affairs of all Departments and who is ultimately responsible for the whole policy of the Cabinet, should give, as he could only give, perfunctory attention to the affairs of our Army in a great war. I am very glad to say that a very distinguished soldier and administrator, in the person of Lord Kitchener, with that great public spirit and patriotism that everyone would expect from him, at my request stepped into the breach. Lord Kitchener, as everyone knows, is not a politician. His association with the Government as a Member of the Cabinet for this purpose must not be taken as in any way identifying him with any set of political opinions. He has, at a great public emergency, responded to a great public call, and I am certain he will have with him, in the discharge of one of the most arduous tasks that has ever fallen upon a Minister, the complete confidence of all parties and all opinions.

I am asking on his behalf for the Army, power to increase the number of men of all ranks, in addition to the number already voted, by no less than 500,000. I am certain the Committee will not refuse its sanction, for we are encouraged to ask for it not only by our own sense of the gravity and the necessities of the case, but by the knowledge that India is prepared to send us certainly two Divisions. and that every one of our self-governing Dominions, spontaneously and unasked, has already tendered to the utmost limits of their possibilities, both in men and in money, every help they can afford to the Empire in a moment of need. Sir, the Mother Country must set the example, while she responds with gratitude and affection to those filial overtures from the outlying members of her family.

I will say no more. This is not an occasion for controversial discussion. In all that I have said, I believe I have not gone, either in the statement of our case, or in any general description of the provision we think it necessary to make, beyond the strict bounds of truth. It is not my purpose—it is not the purpose of any patriotic man—to inflame feeling, to indulge in rhetoric, to excite international animosities. The occasion is far too grave for that. We have a great duty to perform, we have a great trust to fulfil, and confidently we believe that Parliament and the country will enable us to do it.

III

“THE ORANGE BOOK”

PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE CORRESPONDENCE

COUNT BENCKENDORFF	Russian Ambassador at London.
COUNT BERCHTOLD	Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary.
M. BERTHELOT	Of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
M. BRONEFSKY	Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.
M. JULES CAMBON	French Ambassador at Berlin.
BARON GIESL DE GIESLINGEN	Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade.
SIR EDWARD GREY	British Foreign Secretary.
M. ISVOLSKY	Russian Ambassador at Paris.
HERR VON JAGOW	German Minister of Foreign Affairs.
M. KAZANSKY	Gérant of the Russian Consulate at Prague, Austria-Hungary.
PRINCE NICHOLAS KUDACHEF	Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna.
BARON MACCHIO	Of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
M. PASHITCH	Servian Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
DR. PATCHOU	Servian Minister of Finance.
COUNT POURTALÈS	German Ambassador at St. Petersburg.
M. SALVIATI	Russian Consul General at Fiume, Austria-Hungary.
M. SAZONOFF	Russian Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
M. SCHEBEKO	Russian Ambassador at Vienna.
BARON VON SCHOEN	German Ambassador at Paris.
M. SEVASTOPOULO	Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris.
M. STRANDTMAN	Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade.
M. DE SWERBEEW	Russian Ambassador at Berlin.
COUNT SZAPARY Y SZAPAR	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

No. 1. The Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Belgrade, 10-23 July, 1914.

The Austrian Minister has just transmitted at 6 o'clock in the evening to the Minister of Finances Patchou, who is replacing Pashitch, a note in the form of an ultimatum from his Government fixing a time-limit of forty-eight hours for the acceptance of the demands contained therein. Giesl added verbally that in case the note should not be accepted in its integrity within a limit of forty-eight hours, he had orders to leave Belgrade with the Staff of the Legation. Pashitch and the other Ministers, who are absent on electoral campaign, have been recalled and are expected in Belgrade tomorrow, Friday, at 10 o'clock in the morning. Patchou, who communicated to me the contents of the note, solicits the aid of Russia, and declares that no Servian Government will be able to accept the demands of Austria.

(Signed) STRANDTMAN.

No. 2. The Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Belgrade, 10-23 July, 1914.

Text of the Note which was transmitted today by the Minister of Austria-Hungary to the Servian Government:

On March 31st, 1909, the Minister of Serbia in Vienna made, by order of his Government, to the Imperial and Royal Government the following declaration:

"Serbia recognizes that she has not been injured in her rights by the accomplished fact created in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that she will conform in consequence to such decision as the powers will take in regard to Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. Deferring to the counsels of the Great Powers, Serbia undertakes from now on to abandon the attitude of protest and opposition which she has observed in regard to the annexation since last Autumn, and she undertakes, in addition, to change the course of her actual policy toward Austria-Hungary in order to live henceforward with this latter on the footing of good neighborliness (voisinage)."

Now, the history of the late years, and notably the sad event of June 28, have demonstrated the existence in Serbia of a subversive movement the object of which is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy certain parts of its territories. This movement, which was begun under the eyes of the Servian Government, has reached the point of showing itself beyond the territory of the kingdom by acts of terrorism, by a series of attentats, and by murders.

The Royal Government of Serbia, far from keeping the formal engagements contained in the declaration of March 31, 1909, has done nothing to suppress this movement; it has tolerated the criminal activity of the different societies and affiliations directed against the monarchy, the unrestrained language of the press, the glorification of the authors of the attentat, the participation of officers and functionaries in the subversive actions, an unhealthy (malsaine) propaganda in the public instruction—tolerated, in a word, all the manifestations which could lead the Servian population to hatred of the monarchy and disdain (*mépris*) of its institutions.

This culpable tolerance of the Royal Government of Serbia had not ceased at the moment when the events of June 28 last showed to the entire world its dreadful consequences:

It results from the depositions and avowals of the criminal authors of the attentat of June 28 that the murder of Sarajevo was plotted in Belgrade, that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were furnished had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the "Narodna Odbrana," and finally that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and of their arms was organized and effected by chiefs of the Servian frontier service.

The results of the investigation mentioned do not permit the Imperial and Royal Government any longer to pursue the attitude of expectant longanimity which it had observed during years in the face of actions concentrated at Belgrade, and propagated from there over the territories of the monarchy; these results impose upon it, on the contrary, the duty of bringing an end to methods which form a perpetual menace to the tranquility of the monarchy.

It is to attain this object that the Imperial and Royal Government sees itself obliged to demand from the Servian Government the official declaration that it condemns the propaganda directed against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, that is to say, the ensemble of the tendencies which seek in the last result to detach from the monarchy territories which form part of it, and that it undertakes to suppress by all means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

In order to give a solemn character to this engagement the Royal Government of Serbia will have published on the first page of the Official Journal on the date of 26-13 July the following declaration:

The Royal Government of Serbia condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, the ensemble of the tendencies which have the ultimate object of detaching from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories which form part of it, and it deplors sincerely the dreadful consequences of these criminal actions.

The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries should have participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thereby compromise the relations of good neighborhood to which the Royal Government had solemnly engaged itself by its declaration of March 31, 1909.

The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all idea of or attempt at interference in the destinies of the inhab-

itants of any part of Austria-Hungary whatever, considers it its duty to formally notify the officers, the functionaries, and all the population of the kingdom that henceforth it will proceed with the utmost rigor against those persons who should render themselves guilty of such acts, acts which it will use all its efforts to prevent and to repress.

This declaration shall be simultaneously brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army by an order of the day from his Majesty the King, and shall be published in the official bulletin of the army.

The Royal Servian Government engages itself, in addition:

1. To suppress any publication which excites to hatred and disdain of the monarchy, and of which the general tendency is directed against its territorial integrity.

2. To dissolve immediately the society called "Narodna Odbrana," to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against the other societies and affiliations in Servia which give themselves to the propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The Royal Government will take the measure necessary to prevent the dissolved societies from continuing their activity under another name and under another form.

3. To eliminate without delay from the public instruction in Servia, both in regard to the teaching corps and in the methods of education, anything which serves or could serve to foment the propaganda against Austro-Hungary.

4. To remove from the military service and from the administration in general all officers and functionaries guilty of the propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and whose names and acts the Imperial and Royal Government reserves to itself the right to communicate to the Royal Government.

5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of the agents of the Imperial and Royal Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy.

6. To open a judicial inquiry against the partisans of the plot of June 28 who are upon Servian territory. Agents delegated by the Imperial and Royal Government will take part in the investigations bearing thereupon.

7. To proceed immediately to the arrest of Commander Vojja Tankosic and of the nommé Milan Ciganovic, employe of the Servian Government, compromised by the results of the investigation of Sarajevo.

8. To prevent by efficacious measures the assistance of the Servian authorities in the illegal traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier; to dismiss and severely punish the functionaries of the frontier service of Schabatz and Loznica guilty of having aided the authors of the crime of Sarajevo by facilitating their passage across the frontier.

9. To give the Imperial and Royal Government explanations regarding the unjustifiable statements of high Servian functionaries, both in Servia and abroad, who, despite their official positions, did not hesitate after the attentat of 28 June to express themselves in interviews in a manner hostile toward the Austro-Hungarian monarchy; finally,

10. To notify without delay the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised in the preceding points.

The Imperial and Royal Government awaits the reply of the Royal Government at the latest up to Saturday, the 25th of this month, at 6 o'clock in the evening.

A memorandum concerning the results of the investigation of Sarajevo in regard to the functionaries mentioned in points 7 and 8 is annexed to this note.

(Signed) STRANDTMAN.

No. 3. Verbal note transmitted personally by the Ambassador of Austria-Hungary at St. Petersburg to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the 11-24 July, 1914, at 10 o'clock in the morning

The Imperial and Royal Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Royal Government of Serbia on Thursday, 10-23 of the current month, through the medium of the Imperial and Royal Minister at Belgrade:—

(Here follows the text of the note.)

See Document No. 2.

No. 4. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires in Austria-Hungary

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 11-24 July, 1914.

Please transmit to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary the following:

The communication of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the Powers which is entirely insufficient for them to undertake any steps which might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen.

In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the Powers of the results of the enquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study them.

In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice to the Servian Government.

A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations.

Communicated to London, Rome, Paris, Belgrade.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 5. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Representatives of His Majesty the Emperor in England, in Germany, in Italy, and in France

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 11-24 July, 1914.

In reference to my telegram to Kudachef of today, we hope that the Government to whom you are accredited will share our point of view and will urgently instruct its representative in Vienna to express himself along similar lines.

Communicated to Belgrade.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 6. Telegram from His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Servia to His Majesty the Emperor

Belgrade, 11-24 July, 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Government yesterday evening handed to the Servian Government a note concerning the "*attentat*" of Serajevo. Conscious of its international duties, Servia from the first days of the horrible crime declared that she condemned it, and that she was ready to open an inquiry on her territory if the complicity of certain of her subjects were proved in the investigation begun by the Austro-Hungarian authorities. However, the demands contained in the Austro-Hungarian note are unnecessarily humiliating for Servia and incompatible with her dignity as an independent State. Thus we are called upon in peremptory tones for a declaration of the Government in the Official Journal, and an order from the Sovereign to the army wherein we should repress the spirit of hostility against Austria by reproaching ourselves for criminal weakness in regard to our perfidious actions. Then we have to admit Austro-Hungarian functionaries into Servia to participate with our own in the investigation and to superintend the execution of the other conditions indicated in the note. We have received a time-limit of forty-eight hours to accept everything, in default of which the legation of Austria-Hungary will leave Belgrade. We are ready to accept the Austro-Hungarian conditions which are compatible with the position of an independent State as well as those whose acceptance shall be advised us by your Majesty. All persons whose participation in the "*attentat*" shall be proved will be severely punished by us. Certain of these demands cannot be carried out without changes in our legislation, which require time. We have been given too short a limit. We can be attacked after the expiration of the time-limit by the Austro-Hungarian Army which is concentrating on our frontier. It is impossible for us to defend ourselves, and we supplicate your Majesty to give us your aid as soon as possible. The highly prized good will of your Majesty, which has so often shown itself toward us, makes us hope firmly that this time again our appeal will be heard by his generous Slav heart.

In these difficult moments I voice the sentiments of the Servian people, who supplicate your Majesty to interest himself in the lot of the Kingdom of Servia.

(Signed) ALEXANDER.

No. 7. The Chargé d'Affaires in Germany to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Berlin, 11-24 July, 1914.

All the morning papers, even the few which recognize the impossibility of Serbia accepting the conditions laid down, welcome with great sympathy the energetic tone adopted by Austria. The semi-official Lokal-Anzeiger is particularly aggressive. It describes as superfluous the eventual recourse of Serbia to St. Petersburg, to Paris, to Athens, and to Bucharest; and concludes by saying that the German people will breathe freely after it has learned that the situation in the Balkan Peninsula is at last going to be cleared up.

(Signed) BRONEFSKY.

No. 8. The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Paris, 11-24 July, 1914.

The copy of the note officially handed to Belgrade has been communicated by the Austrian Ambassador to the French Government. Later the German Ambassador visited the Minister and read to him a communication reproducing the Austrian arguments, and indicating that in case of refusal on the part of Serbia, Austria would be obliged to have recourse to pressure, and in case of need to military measures; the communication concluded by the remark that in the opinion of Germany this question must be settled directly between Austria and Serbia, and that it was in the interests of the Powers to limit the affair by reserving it to the interested parties. The Gérant of the Political Department, who was present at the interview, asked the Ambassador if the Austrian action should be considered as an ultimatum—in other words if, in case Serbia did not bow entirely to the Austrian demands, hostilities were inevitable. The Ambassador avoided a direct reply by alleging the absence of instructions.

(Signed) SEVASTOPOULO.

No. 9. The Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Belgrade, 11-24 July, 1914.

Pashitch has returned to Belgrade. He intends to give within the time limit, that is to say, by 6 o'clock in the evening, tomorrow, Saturday, a reply to Austria indicating the points acceptable and unacceptable. An appeal to defend the independence of Serbia will be sent out today to the Powers. Finally, added Pashitch, if war is inevitable—we will make war.

(Signed) STRANDTMAN.

No. 10. Communiqué from the Imperial Government

St. Petersburg, 12-25 July, 1914.

The recent events, and the dispatch by Austria-Hungary of an ultimatum to Servia occupy the attention of the Imperial Government in the highest degree. The Government is carefully following the development of the Servo-Austrian conflict, which cannot be a matter of indifference to Russia.

No. 11. The Chargé d'Affaires in Austria-Hungary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Vienna, 12-25 July, 1914.

Count Berchtold is at Ischl. Seeing the impossibility of arriving there in time, I have telegraphed him our proposal to extend the limit of the ultimatum, and I have repeated this verbally to Baron Macchio. The latter promised me to communicate it in time to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but added that he could predict with assurance a categorical refusal.

(Signed) KUDACHEF.

No. 12. The Chargé d'Affaires in Austria-Hungary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Vienna, 12-25 July, 1914.

Following my telegram of today. Have just received from Macchio the negative reply of the Austro-Hungarian Government to our proposal to prolong the time-limit of the note.

(Signed) KUDACHEF.

No. 13. The Chargé d'Affaires in Servia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Belgrade, 12-25 July, 1914.

Received after delay, 14-27 July, 1914.

I transmit the reply which the President of the Servian Ministerial Council has handed to the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade today before the expiration of the delay of the ultimatum:

The Royal Servian Government has received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th-23d of this month, and it is persuaded that its reply will remove any misunderstanding that threatens to spoil (gâter) the good relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

The Royal Government is conscious that the protests which have been made both in the tribune of the national Skupshtina and in the declarations and acts of the responsible representatives of the State, pro-

tests which were cut short by the declaration of the Servian Government under date of 18-31 March, 1909, have not been renewed in regard to the great neighboring monarchy on any occasion, and that since this time both on the part of the Royal Governments which have succeeded one another and on the part of their agents no attempt has been made with the object of changing the state of affairs, either political or judicial, created in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Royal Government note that in this respect the Imperial and Royal Government has made no representation except as regards a schoolbook, on the subject of which the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation.

Servia has numerous times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkanic crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the sacrifice she made in the exclusive interest of European peace that this peace was preserved.

The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character such as the articles in newspapers and the peaceful work of societies, manifestations which take place in almost all countries as an ordinary thing, and which as a general rule escape official control, all the less that the Royal Government at the time of the solution of the whole series of questions which arose between Servia and Austria-Hungary has shown a great care and has succeeded in this fashion in settling the greatest number of them to the profit of the progress of the two neighboring countries.

It is for this the Royal Government has been painfully surprised by the affirmations according to which persons in the Kingdom of Servia had taken part in the preparation of the attempt committed at Serajevo. It expected to be invited to collaborate in the investigation of everything bearing upon this crime, and it was ready, in order to prove by acts its entire correctness, to act against all persons in regard to whom communications should be made to it.

Bowing, then, to the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government is disposed to hand over to the courts any Servian subject without regard to his situation or his rank of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs should be furnished.

It undertakes especially to publish on the first page of the official journal under date of 13-26 July the following declaration:

The Royal Government of Servia condemns all propaganda which might be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, the ensemble of the tendencies which have the ultimate object of detaching from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories which form part of it, and it sincerely deplores the dreadful consequences of these criminal actions.

The Royal Government regrets that certain Servian officers and functionaries should have taken part, according to the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government, in the above-mentioned propaganda and thereby compromised the relations of good neighborliness to which the Royal Government had solemnly pledged itself by its declaration of 18-31 March, 1909.

The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates any

idea of or attempt at interference in the destinies of the inhabitants of any part of Austria-Hungary whatever, considers it is its duty to formally warn officers, functionaries, and all the population of the kingdom that henceforward it will proceed with the utmost rigor against persons who should render themselves guilty of such actions, which it will use all its efforts to prevent and to repress.

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the royal army by an order of the day in the name of his Majesty the King by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official bulletin of the army.

The Royal Government undertakes further:

(1) To introduce at the first regular session of the Skupshtina a clause in the law dealing with the press by which the most severe punishment will fall upon any provocation to hatred and disdain of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as well as upon any publication whose general tendency would be directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary.

It undertakes, at the time of the revision of the Constitution which is soon to come, to introduce into Article 22 of the Constitution an amendment of such a character that the foregoing publications can be confiscated, which is actually, under the categorical terms of Article 22 of the Constitution, an impossibility.

(2) The Government possesses no proof, and the note of the Imperial and Royal Government does not furnish it with any, that the "Narodna Odbrana" society and the other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this kind by any one of their members. Nevertheless the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the Narodna Odbrana society and any other society which should act against Austria-Hungary.

(3) The Servian Royal Government undertakes to eliminate without delay from the public instruction in Servia all that serves or could serve to foment a propaganda against Austria-Hungary when the Imperial and Royal Government shall furnish it with the facts and proofs of this propaganda.

(4) The Royal Government similarly accepts to remove from the military service those whom the judicial inquiry shall prove to have been guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; it expects that the Imperial and Royal Government will communicate to it later the names and the acts of these officers and functionaries for the purposes of the procedure which will follow.

(5) The Royal Government must acknowledge that it does not clearly understand the sense and the meaning of the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government contending that Servia should undertake to accept upon its territory the collaboration of the agents (officers) of the Imperial and Royal Government.

But it declares that it will admit any collaboration which would fit in with the principles of international law and the criminal procedure, as well as accord with good neighborly relations.

(6) The Royal Government, it goes without saying, considers it its duty to open an inquiry against all those who are or who, eventually, might have been mixed up in the plot of 15th June, and who should be found on the territory of the kingdom. As for the participation in this inquiry of agents of the Austro-Hungarian authorities who should be delegated to this effect by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept it, for it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law upon criminal procedure. However, in the concrete cases, communications on the results of the inquiry in question could be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

(7) The Royal Government proceeded, on the evening of the receipt of the note, to the arrest of Commander Voija Tankositch. As for Milan Ciganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy; and who up to the 15th June was employed as aspirant in the Administration of the Railways, he has not yet been found. The Imperial and Royal Government is requested to be so good as, in the accustomed form, to make known the soonest possible the presumptions of culpability, as well as the eventual proofs of culpability, which have been gathered up to this day by the inquiry at Serajevo, for the purpose of the ulterior inquiries.

(8) The Servian Government will strengthen and extend the measures taken to prevent the illegal traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that it will order immediately an inquiry and will severely punish the frontier functionaries on the Schabatz-Loznica Line who have been derelict in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to escape.

(9) The Royal Government will willingly give explanations regarding the statements which its functionaries both in Servia and abroad have made after the attentat in interviews and which according to the affirmation of the Imperial and Royal Government have been hostile toward the monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government shall have communicated to it the passages in question of these statements and as soon as it shall have demonstrated that the statements employed were in effect made by the said functionaries, although the Royal Government itself will undertake to collect proofs and convictions.

(10) The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised in the preceding points in so far as that has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure shall have been ordered and executed. In case the Imperial and Royal Government should not be satisfied with this reply, the Servian Royal Government, considering that it is the common interest not to precipitate the solution of this question, is ready as always to accept a pacific understanding by leaving this question either to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the elaboration of the declarations which the Servian Government made on the 18-31st March, 1909.

(Signed) STRANDTMAN.

No. 14. The Chargé d'Affaires in Germany to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Berlin, 12-25 July, 1914.

Have received your telegram of 11-24 July. Have communicated the contents to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He told me that the English Government had likewise asked him to urge upon Vienna the extension of the time-limit of the ultimatum. He had communicated this step by telegraph to Vienna. He is going to do as much in regard to our step (*démarche*), but he fears that in consequence of the absence of Berchtold at Ischl, and seeing the lack of time, his telegrams will remain without result. He has, besides, doubts about the opportuneness of Austria yielding at the last moment, and he asks if that could not increase the self-assurance of Servia. I replied that a great power like Austria could yield without any injury to its prestige, and brought forward all similar arguments possible. However, I was not able to obtain more precise promises. Even when I let it be understood that it was necessary to act at Vienna in order to avoid the possibility of alarming consequences, the Minister of Foreign Affairs replied each time negatively.

(Signed) BRONEFSKY.

No. 15. The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Paris, 12-25 July, 1914.

Have received the telegram of 11-24 July concerning the extension of the time-limit of the Austrian ultimatum, and have communicated it as instructed. The French Representative in Vienna has received similar instructions.

(Signed) SEVASTOPOULO.

No. 16. The Ambassador in England to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

London, 12-25 July, 1914.

Received telegram of 11-24 July. Grey has instructed the English Ambassador at Vienna to support our *démarche* concerning the extension of the limit of the ultimatum. He told me at the same time that the Austrian Ambassador had come to see him and had explained that the character of an ultimatum must not be attributed to the Austrian note—it must be considered as a *démarche* which, in the case of absence of reply or of insufficient reply within the set limit, would have as a consequence the rupture of diplomatic relations and the immediate departure from Belgrade of the Minister of Austria-Hungary, without entailing, however, the immediate commencement of hostilities. Grey added that in consequence of this explanation he had instructed the English Ambassador at Vienna that in case it should be too late to raise the question of the exten-

sion of the limit of the ultimatum, that of the stay of hostilities might perhaps serve as a basis of discussion.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

No. 17. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 12-25 July, 1914.

In case of a new aggravation of the situation, such as might call for similar action on the part of the Great Powers, we trust that England will not delay in placing herself clearly on the side of Russia and France with a view to maintaining the equilibrium of Europe, for which she has constantly intervened in the past, and which the triumph of Austria would doubtlessly compromise.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 18. Verbal note handed by the Ambassador of Germany to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 12-25 July, 1914

It comes to us from an authoritative source that the news spread by some papers that the step taken by the Government of Austria-Hungary at Belgrade had been made at the instigation of Germany is absolutely false. The German Government had no knowledge of the text of the Austrian note before it was handed in, and has not exercised any influence on its contents. It is a mistake to attribute to Germany a threatening attitude.

Germany naturally supports, as ally of Austria, the claims, in her opinion legitimate claims, of the Cabinet of Vienna against Serbia.

Above all, she desires, as she has already declared at the commencement of the Austro-Servian difference, that this conflict remain localized.

No. 19. The Chargé d'Affaires in France to Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Paris, 12-25 July, 1914.

Refers to my telegram of 11-24 July.

Today a morning journal published, in a form not entirely exact, the declarations of yesterday of the German Ambassador, following them with a commentary attributing to this *démarche* the character of a threat. The German Ambassador, very much moved by this, visited today the Gérant of the Political Department to inform him that his words had in no way the threatening character attributed to them. He declared that Austria had presented its note to Serbia without a precise understanding with Berlin, but that nevertheless Germany approved the point of view of Austria, and that certainly "the arrow once let fly" (these are his own words) Germany could only allow herself to be guided by her duties as ally.

(Signed) SEVASTOPOULO.

No. 20. The Ambassador in England to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

London, 12-25 July, 1914.

Grey told me that the Ambassador of Germany had declared to him that the German Government had not been informed of the text of the Austrian note, but that it entirely supported the Austrian *démarche*. The Ambassador at the same time asked if England would consent to act in St. Petersburg in a spirit of conciliation. Grey replied that that was completely impossible. The Minister added that so long as complications only existed between Austria and Servia, English interests were only indirectly engaged, but that he of course foresaw that Austrian mobilization would have as a consequence the mobilization of Russia, and that from that moment they would be in presence of a situation in which all the Powers would be interested, England reserved in this case complete liberty of action.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

No. 21. The Chargé d'Affaires in Servia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Belgrade, 12-25 July, 1914.

Despite the extremely conciliatory character of the Servian reply to the ultimatum, the Austrian Minister has just, at half past six in the evening, informed the Servian Government by note that not having received a satisfactory response within the set time-limit, he is leaving Belgrade with the whole staff of the legation. The Skuptschina is summoned at Nish for the 14-27 July. The Servian Government and the Diplomatic Corps are leaving this evening for the same town.

(Signed) STRANDTMAN.

No. 22. The Ambassador in England to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

London, 12-25 July, 1914.

Grey told the German Ambassador that in his opinion Austrian mobilization must bring on the mobilization of Russia, that in that case there would arise acute danger of a general war, and that he only saw one single means of a pacific solution: that in presence of the Austrian mobilization, Germany, France, Italy, and England should abstain from an immediate mobilization and propose their good offices straightway. Grey told me that this plan called above all for the agreement of Germany and the engagement of this power not to mobilize. In consequence he has first of all addressed to Berlin a question on this subject.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

No. 23. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in Italy
(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 13-26 July, 1914.

Italy could play a rôle of the very first order in favor of the maintenance of peace by exercising the necessary influence upon Austria and by adopting an attitude clearly unfavorable to the conflict, a conflict which could not be localized. It is desirable that you express the conviction that it is impossible for Russia not to come to the aid of Servia.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 24. The Gérant of the Consulate at Prague to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Prague, 13-26 July, 1914.

Mobilization has been decreed.

(Signed) KAZANSKY.

No. 25. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in Austria-Hungary
(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 13-26 July, 1914.

I had today a long interview in a friendly tone with the Ambassador of Austria-Hungary. After having examined with him the tone of the demands addressed to Servia, I pointed out that apart from the rather awkward form (*la forme peu habile*) in which they are presented, some among them are absolutely impossible even in case the Servian Government should declare its willingness to accept them. Thus, for instance, the points (1) and (2) could not be carried out without an amendment of the Servian laws on the press and on associations for which it would be difficult to obtain the consent of the Skupshtina; as for points (4) and (5), their execution might produce highly dangerous consequences, and even create the risk of acts of terrorism against the members of the Royal House and against Pashitch, and this could not form part of the views of Austria. In regard to the other points, it seems to me that with certain changes in the details it would not be difficult to discover a ground of agreement if the accusations therein were confirmed by sufficient proofs.

In the interest of the preservation of peace, which, according to Szapary's statements, is precious to Austria in the same degree as to all the Powers, it would be necessary to put a stop as soon as possible to the strained situation of the moment. With this object it would seem to me very desirable that the Ambassador of Austria-Hungary should be authorized to enter with me into an exchange of private views with the object of a joint alteration (*remaniement*) of some clauses of the Austrian note of 10-23 July. This proceeding would perhaps permit of finding a formula which should be acceptable for Servia while at the same time giving satisfaction to Austria as to the basis of its demands. Be so good as to

have a prudent and friendly explanation in the sense of this telegram with the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Communicated to the Ambassadors in Germany, in France, in England, and in Italy.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 26. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in Germany

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 13-26 July, 1914.

Please communicate the contents of my telegram of today to Vienna to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs and express the hope to him that on his side he will find it possible to advise Vienna to meet (*aller au devant de*) our proposal.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 27. The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Paris, 13-26 July, 1914.

The Director of the Political Department informs me that when he informed the Austrian Ambassador of the contents of the Servian Reply to the ultimatum, the Ambassador did not conceal his astonishment that it had not given satisfaction to Giesl. The conciliatory attitude of Servia should, in the opinion of the Director of the Political Department, produce the best impression in Europe.

(Signed) SEVASTOPOULO.

No. 28. The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Minister

(Telegram.)

Paris, 13-26 July, 1914.

Today the German Ambassador again called upon the Gérant of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and made him the following declarations:

"Austria has declared to Russia that she does not seek territorial acquisitions and that she does not threaten the integrity of Servia. Her only object is to insure her own tranquility. Consequently it rests with Russia to avoid war. Germany feels herself at one with France in her keen desire to preserve the peace, and strongly hopes that France will use her influence at Petersburg in the direction of moderation." The Minister observed that Germany could on her side take similar steps at Vienna, especially in view of the conciliatory spirit which Servia had shown. The Ambassador answered that such action was impossible, in view of the resolution taken not to interfere in the Austro-Servian conflict. Thereupon the Minister asked if the four Powers—England, Germany, Italy, and France—were not able to take steps at St. Petersburg and Vienna, since the affair reduced itself in essentials to a conflict between Russia and

Austria. The Ambassador pleaded the absence of instructions. Finally the Minister refused to join himself to the German proposal.

(Signed) SEVASTOPOULO.

No. 29. The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Minister

(Telegram.)

Paris, 13-26 July, 1914.

The Director of the Political Department declared that in his personal opinion the successive German *démarches* at Paris had for their object the intimidation of France, and thereby cause her to intervene at St. Petersburg.

(Signed) SEVASTOPOULO.

No. 30. The Chargé d'Affaires in Germany to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Berlin, 13-26th July, 1914.

After the reception in Berlin of the news of the mobilization of the Austrian Army against Serbia, a large crowd composed, according to the newspapers, partly of Austrians, indulged in a series of noisy manifestations in favor of Austria. At a late hour in the evening the demonstrators gathered several times in front of the Imperial Embassy, uttering cries against Russia. There were practically no police present, and no steps were taken.

(Signed) BRONEFSKY.

No. 31. The Ambassador in England to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

London, 14-27 July, 1914.

Received your telegram of 13-26 July. Please telegraph me if in your opinion direct *pourparlers* with the Cabinet of Vienna are in line with Grey's proposal concerning the mediation of the four Governments. Having learned from the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg that you were disposed to accept this combination, Grey decided to give it the form of an official proposal, which he made last night to Berlin, Paris, and Rome.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

No. 32. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors in France and in England

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 14th-27th July, 1914.

The English Ambassador called to ascertain if we thought it desirable for England to take the initiative by summoning at London a conference of the representatives of England, France, Germany, and Italy in order to work out a solution of the present situation.

I replied to the Ambassador that I had opened *pourparlers* with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions that I hope are favorable. However, I have not yet received a reply to the proposal I made for a revision of the note between the two Cabinets.

If direct explanations with the Cabinet of Vienna prove impracticable, I am ready to accept the English proposal or any other calculated to bring about a favorable solution of the conflict.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 33. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors in France, in England, in Germany, in Austria-Hungary, and in Italy

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 14-27th July, 1914.

Have taken note of the reply sent by the Servian Government to Baron Giesl. It exceeds all our anticipations by its moderation and its desire to give the most complete satisfaction to Austria. We do not see what more Austria could demand unless the Cabinet at Vienna is seeking a pretext for a war with Servia.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 34. The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Paris, 14-27 July, 1914.

The German Ambassador again today conferred at length on the situation with the Director of the Political Department. The Ambassador strongly insisted on the exclusion of all possibility of mediation or of a conference.

(Signed) SEVASTOPOULO.

No. 35. The Ambassador in France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Paris, 14-27 July, 1914.

Conferred with the *Gérant* of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in presence of Berthelot, immediately after my return to Paris. Both confirmed to me the details concerning the steps (*démarches*) taken by the German Ambassador, which Sevastopoulo communicated to you in his telegrams. This morning Baron von Schoen confirmed in writing his declaration of yesterday, namely: (1) Austria has declared to Russia that she does not seek acquisitions and does not attack the integrity of Servia. Her only object is to insure her own tranquility; (2) Consequently, it depends upon Russia whether war is averted; (3) Germany and France, completely united in the ardent desire not to break the peace, must influence Russia in the direction of moderation. Baron von Schoen laid special stress on the expression of the united view (*solidarité*) of Germany and France. It is the strong conviction of the Minister of Justice that these *démarches* of Germany are clearly meant to disunite (*désunir*) Russia and France, to draw the French Government into line with the

representations made at St. Petersburg, and thus to compromise our ally in our eyes; finally, in case of war, to throw the responsibility off Germany, which professedly is employing all her efforts to maintain peace, and on to Russia and France.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

No. 36. The Ambassador in France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Paris, 14-27 July, 1914.

It is clear from your telegram of 13-26th July that you did not by then know the reply of the Servian Government. The telegram by which this news was communicated to me from Belgrade was likewise twenty hours en route. The telegram from the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, dispatched the day before yesterday at 11 o'clock in the morning at triple tariff, containing the order to support our demand, only reached its destination at 6 o'clock. There is no doubt that this telegram was intentionally delayed by the Austrian telegraphic authorities.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

No. 37. The Ambassador in France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Paris, 14-27 July, 1914.

By order of his Government the Austrian Ambassador has informed the Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the reply of Serbia has been judged unsatisfactory at Vienna, and that tomorrow (Tuesday) Austria would proceed to "energetic action," the object of which would be to force Serbia to give the necessary guarantees. The Minister asked in what this action would consist, and the Ambassador replied that he had no exact information on the subject, but that it might be a question of crossing the Servian frontier, of an ultimatum, and even of a declaration of war.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

No. 38. The Chargé d'Affaires in Germany to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Berlin, 14-27 July, 1914.

I have requested the Minister of Foreign Affairs to support at Vienna your proposal to authorize Szapary to elaborate by a private exchange of views with you, a presentation (*rédaction*) of the Austro-Hungarian demands that would be acceptable to both parties. Jagow replied that he was acquainted with this proposal, and that he shared the opinion of Pourtalès that, since Szapary had begun this conversation, he might very well continue it. He will telegraph in this sense to the German Ambassador at Vienna. I begged him to urge Vienna in a more pressing

fashion to take up this line of conciliation. Jagow replied that he could not advise Austria to yield.

(Signed) BRONEFSKY.

No. 39. The Chargé d'Affaires in Germany to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Berlin, 14-27 July, 1914.

Today, before my visit to him, the Minister of Foreign Affairs had received the visit of the French Ambassador, who had endeavored to make him accept the English proposal relative to action in favor of peace, such action to be exercised simultaneously at St. Petersburg and at Vienna by England, Germany, Italy, and France. Cambon proposed that these Powers advise Vienna in the following terms: "To abstain from any act which might aggravate the situation at the present hour." By adopting this veiled formula there would be no necessity of mentioning the necessity of abstaining from an invasion of Servia. Jagow opposed a categorical refusal to this proposal in despite of the insistence of the Ambassador, who emphasized, as a good point in the proposal, the mixed grouping of the Powers, so that there would be no opposition of the Alliance to the Entente, and a situation of which Jagow had himself so often complained would be avoided.

(Signed) BRONEFSKY.

No. 40. Telegram from His Imperial Majesty the Emperor to His Royal Highness Prince Alexander of Servia, under date of 14-27 July, 1914

Your Royal Highness in addressing me in a moment of particular difficulty was not deceived in regard to the sentiments which animate me in your regard and in regard to my cordial sympathy for the Servian people.

My most serious attention is drawn by the present situation, and my Government is devoting itself with all its force to smoothing out the present difficulties. I have no doubt that your Highness and the Royal Government wish to facilitate this task by neglecting nothing to arrive at a solution which would prevent the horrors of a new war while at the same time safeguarding the dignity of Servia.

So long as there is the least hope of avoiding bloodshed all our efforts must tend toward this object. If, despite our most sincere desire, we do not succeed, your Highness may be assured that in no case will Russia be indifferent to the fate of Servia.

(Signed) NICOLAS.

No. 41. The Ambassador in Austria-Hungary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Vienna, 14th-27th July, 1914.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs is absent. During a prolonged conversation which I had today with Macchio I drew his attention in entirely

friendly terms to the unfavorable impression that had been produced in Russia by the presentation by Austria to Servia of demands absolutely unacceptable by any independent State, no matter how small. I added that such a proceeding, which might bring about complications of the least desirable kind, had provoked in Russia profound surprise and general reprobation. It must be supposed that Austria, influenced by the assurances of the German representative at Vienna, who during all this crisis has played the rôle of an instigator, counted upon the probability of the localization of her conflict with Servia and on the possibility of striking her a serious blow with impunity. The declaration of the Imperial Government regarding the impossibility for Russia to remain indifferent in the face of such procedure has provoked here a deep impression.

(Signed) SCHEBEKO.

No. 42. The Ambassador in England to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

London, 14th-27th July, 1914.

Grey has just replied to the Ambassador of Germany, who had called to question him regarding the possibility of action at St. Petersburg, that this action should be exercised at Vienna and that the Berlin Cabinet would be best qualified to exercise it. Grey pointed out at the same time that the Servian reply to the Austrian note exceeded by its moderation and its spirit of conciliation anything that could have been expected. Grey added that he concluded that Russia had advised Belgrade to give a moderate reply, and that he thought that the Servian reply could serve as the basis of a pacific and acceptable solution of the question.

Under these conditions, continued Grey, if Austria, despite this reply, began hostilities, her intentions of destroying Servia would be proven. The question placed on this ground would produce a situation which might bring about a war in which all the powers would be involved.

Grey in conclusion declared that the English Government was very sincerely disposed to collaborate with the German Government so long as it was a question of the preservation of peace, but that in the contrary case England reserved a liberty of action.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

No. 43. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in England
(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 15-28th July, 1914.

My interviews with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that Germany is, if anything, in favor of the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria.

The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this crisis developing, appear to be exerting no influence on their ally.

The Ambassador considers that the Servian reply is insufficient.

This attitude of the German Government is most alarming.

It seems to me that England is in a better position than any other Power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce the German Government to take the necessary action. There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 44. The Consul General at Fiume to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Fiume, 15-28th July, 1914.

The state of siege has been proclaimed in Slavonia, in Croatia, and at Fiume, and at the same time the reservists of all classes have been mobilized.

(Signed) SALVIATI.

No. 45. The Ambassador in Austria-Hungary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Vienna, 15-28th July, 1914.

I had a conversation today with Count Berchtold on the line of the instructions from your Excellency. I pointed out to him in the most friendly terms how much it was desirable to find a solution which, while consolidating good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, should give to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy a real guarantee for its future relations with Servia.

I called the attention of Count Berchtold to all the dangers to the peace of Europe which would be brought about by an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

Count Berchtold replied that he understood perfectly well the seriousness of the situation and the advantages of a frank explanation with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. He told me that on the other hand the Austro-Hungarian Government, which had decided only with reluctance upon the energetic measures which it had taken against Servia, could neither withdraw nor enter upon any discussion of the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.

Count Berchtold added that the crisis had become so acute, and that public opinion had been excited to such a degree that the Government, even if it desired, could no longer give its consent to such a course, and this was less possible, he said to me, because the very reply of Servia gave proof of the lack of sincerity in her promises for the future.

(Signed) SCHEBEKO.

No. 46. The Chargé d'Affaires in Germany to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Berlin, 15-28th July, 1914.

The Wolff Bureau has not published the text of the Servian response which was communicated to it. Up to this moment this note has not appeared in extenso in any of the local journals, which, according to all

evidence, do not wish to give a place in their columns, believing that the publication of it would bring a feeling of calmness upon German readers.
(Signed) BRONEFSKY.

No. 47. The Ambassador in Austria-Hungary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Vienna, 15-28th July, 1914.

The decree of general mobilization has been signed.
(Signed) SCHEBEKO.

No. 48. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London
(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 15-28th July, 1914.

In view of the hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia it is necessary that England should urgently undertake mediatory action and that military operations of Austria against Serbia should be immediately suspended; otherwise mediation would only serve as a pretext to delay inordinately the solution of the question and would give Austria meanwhile the possibility to crush Serbia completely and to occupy a dominant situation in the Balkans.

Communicated to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome.
(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 49. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires in Germany
(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 16-29th July, 1914.

The German Ambassador informs me, in the name of the Chancellor, that Germany has not ceased to exercise a moderating influence at Vienna, and that she will continue this action even after the declaration of war. Up to this morning there has been no news that the Austrian armies had crossed the Servian frontier. I requested the Ambassador to transmit to the Chancellor my thanks for the friendly tenor of this communication. I informed him of the military measures taken by Russia, none of which, I said to him, were directed against Germany. I added that they did not indicate aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary, these measures being explained by the mobilization of the greater part of the Austro-Hungarian Army. The Ambassador pronounced himself in favor of direct explanations between the Cabinet of Vienna and us, and I replied that I was quite in favor of that, provided the counsels of the Cabinet of Berlin, of which he spoke, should find an echo in Vienna.

I said at the same time that we were quite ready to accept the proposal for a conference of the four Powers, a proposal with which, apparently, Germany was not in entire sympathy.

I told him that, in my opinion, the best manner of turning to account

the most suitable methods of finding a peaceful solution would be by arranging for parallel discussions to be carried on by a conference of the four Powers—Germany, France, England, and Italy—and by a direct exchange of views between Austria-Hungary and Russia on much the same lines as occurred during the most critical moments of last year's crisis.

I told the Ambassador that, after the concessions which had been made by Serbia, it should not be very difficult to find a compromise to settle the other questions which remained outstanding, provided that Austria showed some good will and that all the Powers used their entire influence in the direction of conciliation.

Communicated to the Ambassadors in England, in France, in Austria-Hungary, and in Italy.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 50. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors in England and in France

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 16–29th July, 1914.

At the time of my conversation with the German Ambassador, of which my preceding telegram treats, I had not yet received the telegram of 15–28th July of M. Schebeko.

This telegram reports the refusal of the Vienna Cabinet to agree to a direct exchange of views with the Imperial Government.

From now on, nothing remains for us to do but to rely entirely on the British Government to take the initiative in the steps which they may consider advisable.

Communicated to Vienna, Rome, and Berlin.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 51. The Chargé d'Affaires in Germany to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Berlin, 16–29 July, 1914.

Upon my question whether he had a reply from Vienna regarding your proposal of private *pourparlers* at St. Petersburg, the Secretary of State replied negatively.

He declares that it is very difficult for him to influence Vienna, especially openly. Speaking to Cambon, he, in fact, added that in case of too evident pressure Austria would hasten to present to Germany a *fait accompli*.

The Secretary of State said he had received today a telegram from Pourtalès from which he gathered that you are disposed to find a compromise acceptable to all even more than you were at the beginning. I replied that probably you had been from the commencement in favor of a compromise, of course on the condition that it should be acceptable not only to Austria but equally to us. He told me next that it appeared that we had begun to mobilize on the Austrian frontier and that he feared that this

would make it more difficult for Austria to come to an understanding with us, particularly as Austria was only mobilizing against Serbia and was making no preparations on our frontier. I replied that according to the information which I had, Austria was equally mobilizing on our frontier, and that consequently we must take similar measures. I added that the measures which we have probably taken on our side were in no wise directed against Germany.

(Signed) BRONEFSKY.

No. 52. The Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Nisch, 16-29th July, 1914.

Today the Minister of Bulgaria, in the name of his Government, informed Pashitch that Bulgaria would observe neutrality.

(Signed) STRANDTMAN.

No. 53. The Ambassador in France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Paris, 16-29 July, 1914.

For the arrival of the President of the French Republic the Minister of Foreign Affairs had prepared a brief summary of the actual political situation more or less in the following terms: Austria, fearing internal division, has used the assassination of the Archduke as a pretext to endeavor to obtain guarantees which may take the form of occupation of Serbian military communications or even of Serbian territory. Germany is supporting Austria. The maintenance of peace depends entirely upon Russia because it is a question of an affair which must be "localized" between Austria and Serbia, namely the punishment of the preceding policy of Serbia and the creation of guarantees for the future. From this Germany concludes that a moderating action must be exercised at Petersburg. This sophistry has been refuted in Paris as in London. In Paris Baron von Schoen in vain tried to draw France into joint action with Germany upon Russia in favor of the maintenance of peace. The same efforts have been made in London. In the two capitals the reply was made that this action must be exercised in Vienna, for the excessive demands of Austria, her refusal to discuss the reservations that Serbia did make, and the declaration of war threatened to provoke a general war. France and England cannot exercise a moderating influence upon Russia, who up to the present has given proof of the greatest moderation, especially in urging upon Serbia to accept all that was possible of the Austrian note. Today Germany seems to abandon the idea of action upon Russia alone and inclines toward mediatory action at Petersburg and Vienna, but at the same time Germany, like Austria, is seeking to drag the matter out to lengths. Germany opposes the conference without indicating any other practical manner of acting. Austria is carrying on *pourparlers* at Petersburg that are clearly dilatory. At the same time she is taking active measures, and if these measures are tolerated her pretensions will increase proportionately. It is very desirable that Russia should lend all her assistance to the plan of mediation.

which Sir Edward Grey will present. Otherwise Austria, under pretext of "guarantees," might practically change the territorial situation of Eastern Europe.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

No. 54. The Ambassador in England to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

London, 16-29th July, 1914.

Have communicated the contents of your telegram of 15-28 July to Grey. He declared today to the German Ambassador that the direct *pourparlers* between Russia and Austria had failed, and that the correspondents of the newspapers telegraphed from St. Petersburg that Russia was mobilizing against Austria in consequence of mobilization by the latter. Grey said that in principle the German Government had declared in favor of mediation, but that it found difficulties in regard to the form. Grey urged the German Government to indicate the form which, according to the opinion of Germany, would permit the four Powers to exercise their mediation to avoid war; seeing the consent of France, Italy, and England had been given, mediation might take place if Germany would only consent to range herself on the side of peace.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

No. 55. The Ambassador in France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Paris, 16-29th July, 1914.

Viviani has just confirmed to me the full determination of the French Government to act in accord with us. This resolution is supported very widely and by all parties, including the Radical-Socialists, who have presented to him a declaration expressing the absolute confidence and the patriotic dispositions of the party. Upon his arrival in Paris Viviani telegraphed urgently to London that, in view of the cessation of direct *pourparlers* between Petersburg and Vienna, it was necessary that the London Cabinet should renew as soon as possible under one or another form its proposal for the mediation of the Powers. Before seeing me Viviani received today the German Ambassador, who renewed the assurance of the pacific tendencies of Germany. Viviani pointed out that if Germany desired peace she should hasten to join herself to the British proposal of mediation, and Baron Schoen replied that the words "conference" or "arbitration" frightened Austria. Viviani replied that it was not a question of words, and that it would be easy to find another form of mediation. According to Baron Schoen, in order that the negotiations between the Powers should succeed, it would be necessary to ascertain what Austria was going to demand from Servia. Viviani replied that the Berlin Cabinet might very easily inquire about this from Austria, but that in the meanwhile the Servian note of reply might serve as a basis of discussion; he added that France was still sincerely desirous of peace, but that she was at the same time determined to act in full harmony

with her allies and friends, and that he (Baron Schoen) could be convinced that this resolution would meet with the liveliest approval of the country.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

No. 56. Telegram from His Royal Highness Prince Alexander of Serbia to His Majesty the Emperor

Deeply moved by the telegram which your Majesty graciously addressed me yesterday, I hasten to thank you with all my heart. I beg your Majesty to be persuaded that the cordial sympathy with which your Majesty is animated toward my country is particularly precious to us, and that our souls are filled with the hope that the future of Serbia is assured since it has become the object of the high solicitude of your Majesty. These painful moments can only strengthen the bonds of the deep attachment which unites Serbia to Holy Slav Russia, and the sentiments of eternal gratitude for the aid and protection of your Majesty will be piously preserved in the souls of all Servians.

(Signed) ALEXANDER.

No. 57. The Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Nish, 16-29th July, 1914.

I communicated to Pashitch the text of the telegraphic reply of his Majesty the Emperor to Prince Alexander. Pashitch, after reading it, crossed himself and said, "Seigneur, the Czar is great and merciful." Then he embraced me, unable to restrain the emotion which had taken possession of him. The heir is expected at Nish in the course of the night.

(Signed) STRANDTMAN.

No. 58. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in France

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 16-29th July, 1914.

Today the German Ambassador communicated to me the resolution taken by his Government to mobilize if Russia did not stop her military preparations. Now we only began these latter as a consequence of the mobilization to which Austria had already proceeded, and in view of the evident absence on the latter's part of any desire to accept any kind of a pacific solution of its conflict with Serbia.

Since we cannot accede to the desire of Germany, it only remains for us to hasten our own armament and to take measures for the probable inevitability of war. Be so good as to notify the French Government and express to it at the same time our sincere gratitude for the declaration which the French Ambassador made me in its name to the effect that

we can count entirely upon the assistance of our ally France. In the present circumstances this declaration is particularly precious to us.

Communicated to the Ambassadors of England, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Germany.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 59. The Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Nish, 17-30 July, 1914.

The Prince Regent published yesterday a manifesto signed by all the Ministers on occasion of the declaration of war by Austria against Serbia. The manifesto finishes with the following words: "Defend with all your strength your homes and Serbia." At the solemn opening of the Skupshchina the Regent read in his name the speech from the throne, at the beginning of which he stated that the place of convocation would show the importance of the present events. Follows the exposé of the facts of the last days—the Austrian ultimatum, the Servian reply, the efforts of the Royal Government to do everything compatible with the dignity of the State to avoid war, and finally the armed aggression of the most powerful neighbor against Serbia, on whose side is found Montenegro. Passing to the examination of the attitude of the Powers in presence of the conflict, the Prince laid stress first of all on the sentiments which animate Russia, and on the very gracious communication of his Majesty the Emperor saying that in no case will Russia abandon Serbia. At each mention of the name of his Imperial Majesty and of Russia a loud and excited "jivio" shook the session hall. The marks of sympathy on the part of France and England were also taken note of separately and provoked "jivios" of approbation on the part of the Deputies. The speech from the throne concludes with the declaration of the opening of the Skupshchina and with the expression of the wish that all measures will be taken to facilitate the task of the Government.

(Signed) STRANDTMAN.

No. 60. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors in Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, England, and Italy

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 17-30 July, 1914.

The German Ambassador, who has just left me, asked me if we could not content ourselves with the promise that Austria could give—not to infringe the integrity of the Kingdom of Serbia—and indicate on what condition we could still agree to suspend our military preparations. I dictated to him, to be transmitted urgently to Berlin, the following declaration:

"If Austria, recognizing that the Austro-Servian question has assumed the character of a European question, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the points which are an infringement of the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia undertakes to cease her military preparations."

Be so good as to telegraph urgently what will be the attitude of the German Government in presence of this new proof of our desire to do everything possible for the pacific solution of the question, for we cannot admit that such *pourparlers* should only have for their purpose to give time to Germany and Austria for their military preparations.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 61. The Ambassador in Germany to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Berlin, 17-30 July, 1914.

I learn that the decree of mobilization of the German Army and fleet has just been promulgated.

(Signed) SWERBEEW.

No. 62. The Ambassador in Germany to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Berlin, 17-30 July, 1914.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs has just telephoned me to say that the news just given of the mobilization of the German Army and fleet is false; that the editions of the newspapers were printed in advance in view of all eventualities and were put on sale at midday, but that now they are confiscated.

(Signed) SWERBEEW.

No. 63. The Ambassador in Germany to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Berlin, 17-30 July, 1914.

Have received your telegram of the 16-29th July and have transmitted the text of your proposal to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, whom I have just seen; he told me that he had received a similar telegram from the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg and declared that he found our proposal unacceptable for Austria.

(Signed) SWERBEEW.

No. 64. The Ambassador in England to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

London, 17-30 July, 1914.

Have communicated the contents of your telegrams of the 16th and 17th July to Grey, who considers the situation very serious, but desires to continue the *pourparlers*. I observed to Grey that since the time that you had offered him to accept anything he might propose that would favor the maintenance of peace, provided that Austria could not profit by the delays to crush Servia, the situation in which you found yourself was apparently modified. At that period our relations with Germany were not com-

promised. After the declaration of the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg concerning the German mobilization these relations had changed, and her demand had received from you the only reply which a great Power could give. When the German Ambassador returned to you and asked for your conditions, you formulated them in altogether special circumstances. I, at the same time, again urged upon Grey the necessity of taking into consideration the new situation created by fault of Germany through the action of the German Ambassador. Grey replied he understood it and that he would take these arguments into consideration.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

No. 65. The Ambassador in England to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

London, 17-30th July, 1914.

The German Ambassador asked Grey why England was taking military measures on land and on sea. Grey replied that these measures had not an aggressive character, but that the situation was such that every Power must prepare itself.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

No. 66. The Ambassador in Austria-Hungary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Vienna, 18-31 July, 1914.

In spite of the general mobilization, I continue to exchange views with Count Berchtold and his collaborators. All insist on the absence both of aggressive intentions on the part of Austria against Russia and of ambitions of conquest in regard to Serbia, but all equally insist on the necessity for Austria to carry out her action to the very end and to give to Serbia a serious lesson which would constitute a real guarantee for the future.

(Signed) SCHEBEKO.

No. 67. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors in Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, England, and Italy
(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 18-31 July, 1914.

Referring to my telegram of 17-30 July. By order of his Government, the English Ambassador transmitted to me the desire of the London Cabinet to introduce certain modifications in the formula which I proposed yesterday to the Ambassador of Germany. I replied that I accepted the English proposal. Herewith I transmit to you the modified formula:

"If Austria agrees to check the advance of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recognising that the dispute between Austria and Serbia has assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and determine whether Serbia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign

State or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude."

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 68. The Ambassador in Germany to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Berlin, 18-31 July, 1914.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs has just told me that our *pourparlers*, which were already difficult in consequence of the mobilization against Austria, have become still more so in presence of the serious military measures which we are taking against Germany; information as to those measures is, according to him, received here from every side and this must inevitably provoke analogous action on the part of Germany.

To that I replied that according to reliable information in my possession which was confirmed by all our compatriots arriving in Berlin, Germany was herself taking quite as active measures against us. Despite that, the Minister of Foreign Affairs affirms that here they are only recalling officers on leave and the troops of the "*champs de manœuvres*."

(Signed) SWERBEEW.

No. 69. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in England
(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, the 18-31 July, 1914.

I have requested the English Ambassador to transmit to Grey the expression of my most sincere gratitude for the friendly and firm tone which he used during the *pourparlers* with Germany and Austria, thanks to which the hope of discovering a pacific issue of the present situation is still not yet lost.

I also asked him to inform the English Minister that I thought that it was only at London that the *pourparlers* would still have some chances of any success by offering to Austria some facilities for a compromise that is so necessary.

Communicated to the Ambassador in France.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 70. Secret Telegram to the Representatives of His Majesty the Emperor Abroad
(Telegram.)

19th July-1st Aug., 1914.

At midnight the German Ambassador declared to me, by order of his Government, that if within 12 hours, that is by midday Saturday, we did not commence demobilization, not only in regard to Germany but also in regard to Austria, the German Government would be forced to give the order of mobilization. To my question if this was war, the Ambassador replied in the negative, but added that we were very near it.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 71. The Ambassador in England to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

London, July 19th-Aug. 1st, 1914.

Grey told me that he had telegraphed to Berlin, that in his opinion the last formula accepted by the Russian Government constituted the basis of negotiations which presented the most chance of a pacific solution of the conflict. He at the same time expressed the hope that no great Power would commence hostilities before the examination of this formula.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

No. 72. The Ambassador in England to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

London, July 19th-1st August, 1914.

The Government of Great Britain has put to the French and German Governments the question whether they would respect the neutrality of Belgium.

France replied in the affirmative, whilst the German Government declared it could not reply to this question categorically.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

No. 73. The Ambassador in France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Paris, 19 July-1 August, 1914.

The Austrian Ambassador yesterday called upon Viviani and declared to him that Austria not only had no intention of infringing the territorial integrity of Servia but was ready to discuss with the other Powers the basis of its conflict with Servia. The French Government is very much concerned by the extraordinary military preparations of Germany on the French frontier, for it is convinced that under the veil of the "*Kriegszustand*" there is a veritable mobilization.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

No. 74. The Ambassador in France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Paris, 19 July-1 August, 1914.

On the reception here of the telegram of the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, which contained the communication made to you by the German Ambassador concerning the resolution of Germany to order today general mobilization, the President of the Republic signed the decree of mobilization. In the streets they are posting up the orders calling in the reservists. The German Ambassador has just paid a visit to Viviani, but made no fresh communication to him, alleging the impossibility of deciphering the telegrams he had received. Viviani informed him of the signature of the decree of mobilization in reply to the German mobilization, and spoke to him of his astonishment that Germany should have

taken such a measure at a moment when a friendly exchange of views was still proceeding between Russia, Austria, and the Powers; he added that the mobilization did not necessarily mean war, and that the German Ambassador might remain in Paris as the Russian Ambassador had remained in Vienna and the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

No. 75. The Ambassador in France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Paris, 19 July—1 August, 1914.

I learn from the President that during these last days the Austrian Ambassador assured the President of the Council of Ministers and himself strongly that Austria had informed us she was ready to respect not only the territorial integrity of Servia, but also its sovereign rights, and that we had intentionally kept silence about this declaration. I opposed a categorical denial to this.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

No. 76. Note handed in by the Ambassador of Germany at St. Petersburg on July 19 (Aug. 1), 1914, at 10 minutes past 7 in the evening

Since the beginning of the crisis the Imperial Government has endeavored to bring about a peaceful solution. In conformity with the wish expressed to him by his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, his Majesty the Emperor of Germany, in agreement with England, was endeavoring to act as mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg, when Russia, without waiting for the results of his efforts, proceeded to mobilize the whole of its land and sea forces.

As the result of this threatening step, for which no motive was afforded by any military preparation on Germany's part, the German Empire found itself face to face with a serious and imminent danger. If the Imperial Government had failed to parry this danger it would have compromised the security and even the existence of Germany. Consequently the German Government found itself compelled to address the Government of his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, and to insist on the cessation of the said military acts. Russia having refused the satisfaction of (*not having thought it should reply to) this demand, and having shown by this refusal (*this attitude) that its action was directed against Germany, I have the honor to inform your Excellency, by my Government's command, as follows:—

His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, raises the gage in the Empire's name and regards himself as in a state of war against Russia.

St. Petersburg, 19 July—1 Aug., 1914.

(Signed) F. POURTALES.

*The words between the parentheses are in the original. It is to be supposed that two variations had been prepared in advance and that by error they were both inserted in the note.

**No. 77. Communiqué of the Minister of Foreign Affairs concerning
the events of the last days**

20th July—2d August, 1914.

An *exposé* distorting the events of the past days has appeared in the foreign press and the Minister of Foreign Affairs believes it his duty to publish the following *aperçu* of the diplomatic *pourparlers* during the time above indicated:

On the 10-23 July (old style) the Minister of Austria-Hungary at Belgrade presented to the Minister President of Servia a note in which the Servian Government was accused of having favored the Pan-Servian movement which had culminated in the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne. In consequence Austria-Hungary called upon the Servian Government not only solemnly to condemn the above-mentioned propaganda but also to take, under control of Austria-Hungary, a series of steps in the investigation of the plot, the punishment of the Servian subjects that had participated in it, and the prevention on the soil of the kingdom of any *attentat* in the future. A time-limit of forty-eight hours was fixed for the Servian Government's reply to the above note.

The Imperial Government, to which the Ambassador of Austria-Hungary at St. Petersburg had communicated the text of the note seventeen hours after its delivery at Belgrade, when it had studied the demands contained therein, saw that among the number were some that it was entirely impossible to comply with, while others were presented in a form incompatible with the dignity of an independent State. It was found inadmissible that the dignity of Servia should be impaired, as it would be by these demands, or that the preponderance of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans should in this way be assured, and the Russian Government pointed out in the most friendly fashion to Austria-Hungary that it would be desirable to submit the points contained in the Austro-Hungarian note to a new examination. The Austro-Hungarian Government did not believe it possible to consent to a discussion of the note. The moderating action of the other Powers at Vienna likewise failed of success.

Although Servia had condemned the crime and had shown herself ready to give satisfaction to Austria in a measure which exceeded the expectations not only of Russia but also of the other Powers, the Minister of Austria-Hungary judged the Servian reply inadequate and left Belgrade.

Recognizing the excessive character of the demands presented by Austria, Russia had previously declared that it would be impossible for her to remain indifferent, while at the same time she was willing to employ all her efforts to obtain a pacific solution which would be acceptable to Austria and satisfy her *amour-propre* as a great power. At the same time Russia stated firmly that she only admitted such a pacific solution of the question as would not imply the diminution of the dignity of Servia as an independent State. Unfortunately all the efforts made by the Imperial Government in this direction remained without effect. The Austro-Hungarian Government, after evading (*s'être dérobé*) every conciliatory intervention of the Powers in its conflict with Servia, proceeded to mobilize, officially declared war on Servia, and the following day

bombarded Belgrade. The manifesto which accompanied the declaration of war openly accused Serbia of having prepared and carried out the crime of Serajevo. Such an accusation of a Common Law crime against a whole people and a whole Government drew to Serbia by the clear lack of any foundation for it great sympathy throughout Europe.

As a consequence of this course of action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government despite the declaration of Russia that she could not remain indifferent to the lot of Serbia, the Imperial Government judged it necessary to order the mobilization of the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan. Such a decision was necessary because between the date of the handing of the Austro-Hungarian note to the Servian Government and the first steps of Russia, five days had passed, and meanwhile the Cabinet of Vienna had made no step to meet our pacific efforts—on the contrary, the mobilization of half of the Austro-Hungarian Army had been decreed.

The German Government was informed of the measures taken by Russia. Explanations were at the same time made that these measures were only the consequence of the Austrian armament and in no wise were they directed against Germany. At the same time the Imperial Government declared that Russia was ready to continue the *pourparlers* towards a pacific solution of the conflict, either by means of direct negotiations with the Cabinet of Vienna or, following the proposal of Great Britain, by means of a conference of the four Great Powers not directly interested, namely, England, France, Germany, and Italy.

However, this attempt of Russia also failed. Austria-Hungary declined a further exchange of views with us, and the Cabinet at Vienna evaded participation in the projected Conference of the Powers.

Nevertheless Russia did not discontinue her efforts in favor of peace. Replying to the question of the German Ambassador as to the conditions under which we would still consent to suspend our armament, the Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that these conditions would be the recognition by Austria-Hungary that the Austro-Servian question had taken the character of a European question, and the declaration of this same Power that she would consent not to insist on demands that were incompatible with the sovereign rights of Servia.

The proposal of Russia was judged by Germany to be unacceptable for Austria. Simultaneously there was received at St. Petersburg the news of the proclamation of general mobilization by Austria-Hungary.

At the same time hostilities continued on Servian territory and Belgrade was again bombarded.

The failure of our pacific proposals obliged us to increase the military measures of precaution.

The Berlin Cabinet addressed to us a question on this subject, and reply was made that Russia was forced to begin to arm in order to safeguard herself against all eventualities.

While taking this measure of precaution, Russia none the less did not cease to seek, with all her powers, an issue from the situation, and declared herself ready to accept any method of solution of the conflict which would meet the conditions that we laid down.

Notwithstanding this conciliatory communication, the German Government, 18-31 July, addressed a demand to the Russian Government

for the suspension of her military measures by mid-day of the 19 July-1st August, threatening otherwise to proceed to a general mobilization.

Next day, 19th July-1st August, the Ambassador of Germany transmitted to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the name of his Government, the declaration of war.

No. 78. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Representatives of His Majesty the Emperor abroad

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 20 July-2 August, 1914.

It is absolutely clear that Germany is already endeavoring to throw upon us the responsibility of the rupture. Our mobilization was provoked by the enormous responsibility which we should have incurred if we had not taken all precautionary measures at a moment when Austria, confining herself to *pourparlers* that were only meant to gain time, was bombarding Belgrade and proceeding to a general mobilization.

His Majesty the Emperor had undertaken, by giving his personal word to the Emperor of Germany, not to undertake any aggressive act so long as the *pourparlers* with Austria should continue. After such a guarantee, and after all the proofs of Russia's love for peace, Germany could not and had no right to doubt our declaration that we would accept with joy any pacific issue compatible with the dignity and independence of Servia. Any other solution would be completely incompatible with our own dignity, and would certainly have shaken European equilibrium by ensuring the hegemony of Germany. This European, even world-wide, character of the conflict is infinitely more important than the pretext which created it. By its decision to declare war upon us at a moment when the negotiations between the Powers were still being carried on, Germany has assumed a heavy responsibility.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 79. Note handed by the Ambassador of Austria-Hungary at St. Petersburg to the Minister of Foreign Affairs the 24th July, at 6 o'clock in the evening

By order of his Government the undersigned Ambassador of Austria-Hungary has the honor to notify his Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia as follows:

In view of the menacing attitude taken by Russia in the conflict between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Servia, and since Russia, as a consequence of this conflict, according to a communication from the Cabinet of Berlin, has deemed it advisable to open hostilities against Germany, and since Germany consequently finds herself in a state of war with the said power, Austria-Hungary considers herself equally in a state of war with Russia from the present moment.

(Signed) SZAPARY.

St. Petersburg, 24th July (Aug. 6), 1914.

IV

THE ORIGINAL TEXTS OF THE AUSTRIAN NOTE OF JULY 23, 1914, AND THE SERVIAN REPLY OF JULY 25, 1914, WITH ANNOTATIONS

Note.—Much of the discussion in this country with regard to the completeness with which Serbia expressed herself as willing to comply with the Austrian demands has been based upon the translations of the notes of the two different governments, which appeared in England and were reprinted in the American press. The translations of the two notes, (already published in this series) were evidently made by different men, and in many cases the same French word was assigned two different meanings. Since these notes constitute the first steps in the diplomatic crisis which resulted in the general outbreak of war, and are historic documents of the first importance, they are now reprinted in the original French in parallel columns, with comments upon these discrepancies of translation.

EDITOR

International Conciliation.

AUSTRIAN DEMANDS

... le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie ¹*fera publier* à la ²*première* page du "Journal officiel" en date du 26 juin (13 juillet) l'énonciation suivante:—

"Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie ³*condamne* la propagande dirigée contre l'Autriche - Hongrie, ⁴*c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires* ⁵*qui en font partie*, et il déplore sin-

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... il s'engage à ¹*faire publier* à la ²*première* page du "Journal officiel" en date du 13 (26) juillet, l'énonciation suivante:

"Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie ³*condamne* toute propagande qui serait dirigée contre l'Autriche - Hongrie, ⁴*c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires* ⁵*qui en font partie*,

AS TRANSLATED IN AUSTRIAN NOTE

¹ Shall publish.....

² Front.....

³ Condemns.....

⁴ *i.e.*, To general tendency of which the final aim is to detach.....

⁵ Belonging to it.....

AND IN SERVIAN

Cause to be published.

First.

Condemn (and so throughout).

That is to say, all such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching. Which form part thereof.

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cèrement les conséquences ⁶ *funestes* de ces ⁷ *agissements* criminels.

"Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes ⁸ *aient participé* à la propagande susmentionnée et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auquel le Gouvernement Royal s'était solennellement ⁹ *engagé* par ¹⁰ *sa* déclaration du 31 mars, 1909.

"Le Gouvernement Royal, qui désapprouve et répudie toute ¹¹ *idée ou tentative d'immixtion* dans les ¹² *destinées* des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considère de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les ¹³ *fonctionnaires* et toute la population du royaume que dorénavant il procédera ¹⁴ *avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes* qui

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et il déplore sincèrement les conséquences ⁶ *funestes* de ces ⁷ *agissements* criminels. Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que certains officiers et fonctionnaires serbes ⁸ *aient participé*, d'après la communication du Gouvernement Royal et Impérial, à la propagande susmentionnée, et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auxquelles le Gouvernement Royal serbe était solennellement ⁹ *engagé* par ¹⁰ *sa* déclaration du 31 mars, 1909, qui désapprouve et répudie toute ¹¹ *idée ou tentative d'une immixtion* dans les ¹² *destinées* des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que se soit, considère de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers et ¹³ *fonctionnaires* et toute la population du royaume que, dorénavant, il procédera ¹⁴ *avec*

AS TRANSLATED IN AUSTRIAN NOTE

- ⁶ Fatal.....
- ⁷ Proceedings.....
- ⁸ Participated.....
- ⁹ Pledged.....
- ¹⁰ Its.....
- ¹¹ All idea of interfering or attempting to interfere.....
- ¹² Destinies.....
- ¹³ Functionaries.....
- ¹⁴ Proceed with the utmost rigour against persons.....

AND IN SERVIAN

- Baneful.
- Movements.
- Should have taken part.
- Engaged.
- The.
- All idea or attempt at interference.
- Destiny.
- Officials.
- Take the most rigorous steps against all such persons.

AUSTRIAN DEMANDS

¹⁵ *se rendraient coupables de pareils* ¹⁶ *agissements* qu'il mettra tous ses efforts ¹⁷ *a prévenir et à réprimer.*"

Cette énonciation sera portée simultanément à la connaissance de l'Armée Royale ¹⁸ *par* un ordre du jour de Sa Majesté le Roi et sera publiée dans le "Bulletin officiel" de l'armée.

Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage en outre:

1. à supprimer toute publication qui excite à la haine ¹⁹ *et* au mépris de la Monarchie et dont la tendance générale est dirigée contre son intégrité territoriale,

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la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui ¹⁵ *se rendraient coupables de pareils* ¹⁶ *agissements*, qu'il mettra tous ses efforts ¹⁷ *a prévenir et à réprimer.*"

Cette énonciation sera portée à la connaissance de l'armée Royale ¹⁸ *par* un ordre du jour, au nom de Sa Majesté le Roi, par Son Altesse Royale le Prince héritier Alexandre, et sera publié dans le prochain bulletin officiel de l'armée.

Le Gouvernement Royal s'engage en outre:

1. D'introduire dans la première convocation régulière de la Skoupchtina une disposition dans la loi de la presse, par laquelle sera punie de la manière la plus sévère la provocation à la haine ¹⁹ *et* au mépris de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, ainsi que contre toute publication dont la tendance générale serait dirigée contre l'intégrité territoriale de l'Autriche-Hongrie. Il se charge, lors de la revision de la Constitution, qui est prochaine, à faire in-

AS TRANSLATED IN AUSTRIAN NOTE

¹⁵ Who may be guilty.....

¹⁶ Machinations.....

¹⁷ Which it will use all its efforts to anticipate and suppress.....

¹⁸ As.....

¹⁹ And.....

AND IN SERVIAN

As are guilty.
Acts.

To prevent and to repress which they will use their utmost endeavour.

In.

Or.

AUSTRIAN DEMANDS

2. à dissoudre immédiatement la société dite "Narodna Odbrana," à confisquer tous ses moyens de propagande, et à procéder de la même manière contre les autres sociétés et affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent à la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise; le Gouvernement Royal prendra les mesures nécessaires pour que les sociétés dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer leur activité sous un autre nom et sous une autre forme,

3. à ²⁰ *éliminer* sans délai de ²¹ *l'instruction publique* en Serbie, tant en ce qui concerne le corps enseignant que les moyens d'instruction, tout ce qui sert ou ²² *pourrait* servir à fomenter ²³ *la* propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie,

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introduire dans l'article 22 de la Constitution un amendement de telle sorte que les publications ci-dessus puissent être confisquées, ce qui actuellement aux termes catégoriques de l'article 22 de la Constitution est impossible.

2. Le Gouvernement ne possède aucune preuve et la note du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne lui en fournit non plus aucune que la société "Narodna Odbrana" et autres sociétés similaires aient commis, jusqu'à ce jour quelques actes criminels de ce genre, par le fait d'un de leurs membres. Néanmoins, le Gouvernement Royal acceptera la demande du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal et dissoudra la société "Narodna Odbrana" et toute autre société qui agirait contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

3. Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage à ²⁰ *éliminer* sans délais de ²¹ *l'instruction publique* en Serbie dans ce qui sert ou ²² *pourrait* servir à fomenter ²³ *la* propagande contre l'Autriche - Hongrie, quand le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui fournira des faits et

AS TRANSLATED IN AUSTRIAN NOTE

- ²⁰ Eliminate.....
²¹ Public instruction.....
²² Might.....
²³ The.....

AND IN SERVIAN

- Remove.
 Public educational establishments.
 Could.
 (omits)

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4. à éloigner ²⁴ du service militaire et de l'administration en général tous les officiers et fonctionnaires coupables de la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et dont le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se réserve de communiquer les noms et les faits au Gouvernement Royal,

5. à accepter la collaboration en Serbie des ²⁵ *organes* du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal dans la suppression du mouvement subversif dirigé contre l'intégrité territoriale de la Monarchie,

6. à ouvrir une enquête judiciaire contre les partisans du complot du 28 juin se

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des preuves de cette propagande.

4. Le Gouvernement Royal accepte de même à éloigner ²⁴ du service militaire ceux pour qui l'enquête judiciaire aura prouvé qu'ils sont coupables d'actes dirigés contre l'intégrité du territoire de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, et il attend que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui communique ultérieurement les noms et les faits de ces officiers et fonctionnaires aux fins de la procédure qui doit s'ensuivre.

5. Le Gouvernement Royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas clairement compte du sens et de la portée de la demande du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal que la Serbie s'engage à accepter sur son territoire la collaboration des ²⁵ *organes* du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, mais il déclare qu'il admettra la collaboration qui répondrait aux principes du droit international et à la procédure criminelle ainsi qu'aux bons rapports de voisinage.

6. Le Gouvernement Royal, cela va de soi, considère de son devoir d'ouvrir une enquête

AS TRANSLATED IN AUSTRIAN NOTE

²⁴ From the military service.....

²⁵ Representatives.....

AND IN SERVIAN

From military service.

Organs.

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trouvant sur territoire serbe; des organes, délégués par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, prendront part aux recherches y relatives,

7. à procéder d'urgence à l'arrestation du ²⁶ *Commandant* Voijsa Tankosic et du nommé Milan Ciganovic, employé de l'Etat serbe, compromis par les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo,

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contre tous ceux qui sont ou qui, éventuellement, auraient été mêlés au complot du 15 juin, et qui se trouveraient sur le territoire du royaume. Quant à la participation à cette enquête des agents ou autorités austro-hongrois qui seraient délégués à cet effet par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas l'accepter, car ce serait une violation de la Constitution et de la loi sur la procédure criminelle; cependant dans des cas concrets des communications sur les résultats de l'instruction en question pourraient être données aux agents austro-hongrois.

7. Le Gouvernement Royal a fait procéder, dès le soir même de la remise de la note, à l'arrestation du ²⁶ *Commandant* Voislav Tankossitch. Quant à Milan Ziganovitch, qui est sujet de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et qui jusqu'au 15 juin était employé (comme aspirant) à la direction des chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore être arrêté.

Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois est prié de vouloir bien, dans la forme accoutumée, faire connaître le plus

AS TRANSLATED IN AUSTRIAN NOTE

AND IN SERVIAN

²⁶ Major..... Commandant.

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8. à empêcher, par des mesures efficaces, le concours des autorités serbes dans le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière;

à licencier et punir sévèrement les fonctionnaires du service-frontière de Schabatitz et de Loznica coupables d'avoir aidé les ²⁷ auteurs du crime de Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage de la frontière,

9. à donner au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal des explications sur les ²⁸ *propos* injustifiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes ²⁹ *tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger*, qui, malgré leur position officielle, n'ont pas hésité après l'attentat du 28 juin de s'exprimer dans des interviews d'une manière hostile envers la Monarchie austro-hongroise, enfin

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tôt possible, les présomptions de culpabilité ainsi que les preuves éventuelles de leur culpabilité qui ont été recueillies jusqu'à ce jour par l'enquête à Sarajevo, aux fins d'enquête ultérieure.

8. Le Gouvernement serbe renforcera et étendra les mesures prises pour empêcher le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière. Il va de soi qu'il ordonnera de suite une enquête et punira sévèrement les fonctionnaires des frontières sur la ligne Schabatitz-Loznitz qui ont manqué à leurs devoirs et laissé passer les ²⁷ auteurs du crime de Sarajevo.

9. Le Gouvernement Royal donnera volontiers des explications sur les ²⁸ *propos* que ses fonctionnaires, ²⁹ *tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger*; ont eu après l'attentat dans des entrevues et qui, d'après l'affirmation du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, ont été hostiles envers la Monarchie, dès que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui aura communiqué les passages en question de ces *propos*, et dès qu'il aura démontré que les *propos* em-

AS TRANSLATED IN AUSTRIAN NOTE

AND IN SERVIAN

²⁷ Perpetrators.....	Authors.
²⁸ Utterances.....	Remarks.
²⁹ Both in Serbia and . . .	Whether in Serbia or . . .

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10. d'avertir, sans retard, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents.

Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal attend la réponse du Gouvernement Royal au plus tard jusqu'au samedi, 25 de ce mois, à 6 heures du soir.

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ployés ont, en effet, été tenus par lesdits fonctionnaires, quoique le Gouvernement Royal lui-même aura soin de recueillir des preuves et convictions.

10. Le Gouvernement Royal informera le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents en tant que cela n'a pas été déjà fait par la présente note, aussitôt que chaque mesure aura été ordonnée et exécutée.

Dans le cas où le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne serait pas satisfait de cette réponse, le Gouvernement serbe, considérant qu'il est de l'intérêt commun de ne pas précipiter la solution de cette question, est prêt comme toujours d'accepter une entente pacifique, soit en remettant cette question à la décision du Tribunal international de La Haye, soit aux Grandes Puissances qui ont pris part à l'élaboration de la déclaration que le Gouvernement serbe a faite le 18 (31) mars, 1909.

Belgrade, le 12 (25) juillet, 1914.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Nos. 1-66 (April, 1907, to May, 1913). Including papers by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane and others. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application.

67. Music as an International Language, by Daniel Gregory Mason, June, 1913.

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

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